Military Alliance Networks

Deborah E. Lange

Chapter Chapter 3 in Power and Influence, 2010, pp 35-39 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract In the previous chapter, other reasons were found in addition to trade that are likely to lead to cooperative voting, and security issues are probably a component that induces reciprocal behavior in the UN. See figure 3.1 for alliance networks of 1990 and 2000 that include all UNGA countries. From 1990–2000, only years in which a significant network change occurs are discussed, but for simplicity not all the diagrams are shown. In these networks, an alliance exists as a network tie or it does not, types of alliances are not included, and a tie is non-directional because each agreement is bilateral. So, either there can be bidirectional arrows between countries that are officially allies according to binding agreements or, as can be removed, the arrows is done so the diagrams are cleaner to view. What is interesting about these diagrams are the obvious clusters of allies. Also, some bonds are broken and created over time, sometimes joining or disconnecting clusters.

Keywords: Previous Chapter; Vote Pattern; Soviet State; Reciprocal Behavior; Alliance Network (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-11554-5_4

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DOI: 10.1057/9780230115545_4

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