 Corporate Governance and Stockholder/Stakeholder Activism in the United States, 1790–1860: New Data and PerspectivesRobert E. Wright and Richard Sylla Chapter Chapter 11 in Origins of Shareholder Advocacy, 2011, pp 231-251 from Palgrave Macmillan Abstract: Abstract The early United States based much of its financial development on European precedents modified to fit American circumstances and to take advantage of opportunities presenting themselves to a new nation. One area of financial development in which the United States most differed from European precedents was that of the business corporation. In Europe, corporations tended to be privileged monopolies, and there were relatively few of them. The first promoters of U.S. corporations may have had the European model in mind, but increasingly found themselves overwhelmed by democratic political forces that insisted upon the extension of corporate privileges to nearly all white males who desired them. It was in the United States, therefore, starting in the 1790s when about 300 corporations were chartered, that the old European idea of the corporation as privileged monopoly began to be transformed into the modern idea of the corporation as a competitive enterprise. Keywords: Corporate Governance; Vote Rule; Large Stockholder; Business Corporation; Corporate Governance System (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-11666-5_11 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Palgrave Macmillan Books from Palgrave Macmillan |
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