Uncertainty and Transparency of Monetary Policy

Giorgio Giorgio and Guido Traficante
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Giorgio Giorgio: Università LUISS

Chapter 8 in Financial Institutions and Markets, 2010, pp 187-203 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract What is the proper degree of central bank transparency? This chapter investigates the issue in a framework characterized by (a) common uncertainty on potential output and (b) imperfect knowledge of the central bank target by the private sector. We show that full transparency is socially beneficial under a variety of parametrizations. Our results confirm, in a different setup, those of Faust and Svensson (2001, 2002), and Svensson (2006).

Keywords: Private Sector; Monetary Policy; Potential Output; Relative Risk Aversion; Inflation Target (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-11736-5_8

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DOI: 10.1057/9780230117365_8

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