The Role of Preferences and the Sustainability of EMU

Francisco Torres ()

Chapter 3 in The Future of EMU, 2009, pp 54-74 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Failed political attempts and successful political compromises on European monetary integration can be explained in terms of convergence of preferences over time. This is obviously tempered by the circumstances of each political and economic phase of European integration and the corresponding bargaining power of countries with different preferences.

Keywords: Monetary Policy; European Central Bank; Monetary Union; European Monetary Union; Epistemic Community (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-23389-8_4

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DOI: 10.1057/9780230233898_4

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