On the Exodus of the Wealth of Nations

Sigmund Wagner-Tsukamoto
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Sigmund Wagner-Tsukamoto: University of Leicester

Chapter 4 in Is God an Economist?, 2009, pp 140-168 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Genesis culminated in the Joseph story with successful cooperation emerging between Egypt and Israel. Then, economic cooperation principles helped to resolve potential social conflict and a mutually beneficial societal contract was established. Genesis achieved the vision of a universal brotherhood of humans. This chapter discusses the apparent counter-story in the book of Exodus when cooperation between Egypt and Israel broke down in a dramatic way (see also Wagner-Tsukamoto 2008a). It will become apparent that the Exodus story did not resolve potentially dilemmatic interaction problems and it did not master pluralism as an interaction condition. Seemingly, mutual loss resulted for both parties. The chapter thus reinforces by anti-thesis to the Joseph story that biblical ideals for resolving social conflict mirror institutional economic ideals. I suggest that the key source of conflict in Exodus was the unsuccessful intervention with economic institutions (constitutional contract, governance structures, property rights, reward systems, etc.) and the ignorance of economic cooperation principles, which focus on the idea of the wealth of nations. The book of Exodus very prominently hinted at this right at its outset when it stated that ‘a new king, who did not know about Joseph, came to power in Egypt’ (Exodus 1: 8). Joseph, of course, stood, in Genesis, for successful institutional economic ordering. Hence, I subsequently do not analyse and praise the Exodus, as conventionally done by theology and religious economics, as the successful resolution of conflict over religious values and the escape of Israel from a claimed system of slavery. As counter thesis to the hero thesis for Joseph, the present chapter develops an anti-hero thesis, better, a non-hero thesis for Moses (and the pharaoh and God of Exodus too). I also advance a decline thesis for the Exodus story. This contrasts with the climax thesis for the Joseph story developed in the previous chapter.

Keywords: Collective Bargaining; Industrial Relation; Mutual Gain; Distribution Conflict; Common Pool Problem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-23409-3_5

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DOI: 10.1057/9780230234093_5

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