Asylum Cooperation among Asymmetric Countries

Mathias Czaika

Chapter 6 in The Political Economy of Refugee Migration and Foreign Aid, 2009, pp 88-113 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract This chapter argues that asylum cooperation for tackling the consequences of large asylum migration inflows is only possible among rather symmetric countries. Highly asymmetric countries have no incentives to join and remain in a stable coalition. The distinction of cost and spillover asymmetries shows that financial transfers may only release participation constraints, and thus, make asylum cooperation feasible, if they are focused on tackling this asymmetry. This result becomes relevant when applied to the context of the enlarged European Union. I argue that there is potential for a future cooperative burden-sharing regime for asylum, and particularly, if unanimity is replaced by the double majority principle in votes of the European Council, as the EU reform treaty suggests.

Keywords: Asylum Seeker; Participation Constraint; Monetary Transfer; Cost Asymmetry; Asylum Application (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-27420-4_6

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DOI: 10.1057/9780230274204_6

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