Why Pension Investors and Asset Managers Differ

Kees Koedijk and Alfred Slager
Additional contact information
Kees Koedijk: Tilburg University
Alfred Slager: Tilburg University

Chapter 4 in Investment Beliefs, 2011, pp 39-45 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Perhaps one of the puzzling aspects of the investment industry is that pension funds and asset managers seem to get along so well. In the past years, the costs and complexity of trustees’ investments has been steadily rising. So have the incomes of asset managers, their advisors and other intermediaries, despite the fact that asset managers have not been able to fulfill expectations of investment returns. Pension funds and asset managers clearly do stifle innovation in products and services and progress in new investment concepts. In this chapter, we demonstrate these striking difference. But first, we look into why they are different – what economists refer to as the principal–agent problem.

Keywords: Real Estate; Risk Premium; Pension Fund; Agent Problem; Asset Manager (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-30757-5_4

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.palgrave.com/9780230307575

DOI: 10.1057/9780230307575_4

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Palgrave Macmillan Books from Palgrave Macmillan
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().