Rational and Moral Action

Jan Jonge

Chapter XIV in Rethinking Rational Choice Theory, 2012, pp 199-206 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract The question of whether a state of affairs is desirable because it is desired or whether it is desired because it desirable only makes sense when this can be discussed in a somewhat objective way. This means that reasons can be advanced that support the claim that the properties of a state of affairs that is to be brought about (or to be avoided) are desirable (or not desirable). A connected discussion refers to the motivation to act. Rational choice theory endorses the classical argument that reasons require motivation and motivation requires a desire (though the desire may be located at the background). This argument is contained in the concept of a motivated reason. I have defended the relevance of Nagel’s concept of a motivated desire. Also the defence of this concept requires that arguments can be exchanged and that an autonomous decision is not simply equated with desiring what you want.

Keywords: Moral Judgment; Moral Action; Moral Consideration; Rational Choice Theory; Moral Knowledge (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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DOI: 10.1057/9780230355545_16

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