Theory of Voting

Anatol Rapoport

Chapter 14 in Decision Theory and Decision Behaviour, 1998, pp 297-312 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract The most familiar type of democratic decision is majority rule. It reflects the rather vague principle of ‘the greatest good for the greatest number’ (Bentham, 1780[1948]) and can be so interpreted if social good is measured by the number of people pleased by the result of an election or a referendum, provided there are exactly two candidates or two ways of voting on an issue.

Date: 1998
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DOI: 10.1057/9780230377769_15

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