Bank Insolvency and Deposit Insurance: A Proposal (1993)

C. A. E. Goodhart
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C. A. E. Goodhart: London School of Economics

Chapter 17 in The Central Bank and the Financial System, 1995, pp 414-429 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract The experience of recent bank failures in several major countries — Johnson Matthey in the UK, Continental Illinois in the USA and Canadian Commercial Bank — has pointed up a number of intractable problems facing central banks and bank regulatory authorities. First, if really large banks are always to be prevented from failing, then either there will be inequitable treatment between large and small, with a resulting tendency towards oligopoly, or all banks must enjoy similar protection, which will exacerbate moral hazard problems. This issue is discussed in section 17.2.

Keywords: Central Bank; Moral Hazard; Commercial Bank; Large Bank; Financial Intermediary (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995
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DOI: 10.1057/9780230379152_17

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