Creating Trust in the Korean Chaebol

John Barry Kotch

Chapter 15 in Trust and Antitrust in Asian Business Alliances, 2004, pp 330-349 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract The ‘chaebol’ – the family-owned conglomerates and crown jewels of the Korean economy – with assets greater than the half trillion (US$) Korean GNP (where one trillion is 1012) have suffered a pounding of late: on the issue of trust.1 Two of the top five chaebol, with sales in excess of US$100 billion and US$50 billion, respectively, have been mired in scandal.2 Hyundai’s Asan subsidiary – bankrolled by the late Hyundai chairman, Chung Ju Yung, and at the forefront of South–North tourism at Mt Kumgang – has been accused of serving as a government conduit in funneling US$500 million to Pyongyang to facilitate the June 2000 inter-Korean summit, while SK Corporation has been at the centre of an insider trading and accounting fraud scandal.3 In both cases, the South Korean government appears to have been either complicit or less than candid in its response, thus compounding the issue of trust.

Keywords: Corporate Governance; Minority Shareholder; World Economic Forum; Foreign Exchange Reserve; Korean Economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-52357-9_15

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DOI: 10.1057/9780230523579_15

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