Group Mobilization and Rent-Seeking

Gert Svendsen

Chapter 2 in Green Taxation in Question, 2001, pp 17-43 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract We start by establishing the first political constraint which determines the actual design of green taxation, namely that of ‘rentseeking’. Rent-seeking is defined as ‘the use of resources in lobbying and other activities directed at securing protective legislation’ (McKenzie and Tullock 1981). A concept originally introduced by Tullock (1967), it has had a wide-ranging impact on social sciences in general (Fishback, Libecap and Zajac 2000). The general idea is that rent-seeking affects the level of green taxation in favour of well organized interest groups. As such, rent-seeking may explain why the economists’ long recommended uniform taxation of pollution has not been applied.

Keywords: Space Heating; Voluntary Agreement; Green Taxation; Uniform Taxation; Electric Utility Industry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-59553-8_2

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DOI: 10.1057/9780230595538_2

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