Parties Matter

Carsten Daugbjerg

Chapter 3 in Green Taxation in Question, 2001, pp 45-81 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Chapter 2 described the incentives to organize and rent-seek within a group and how this affects the design of green tax schemes. We concluded that since producers are a relatively small and well-defined group, they each have a significant incentive to engage in collective action because the benefits are likely to outweigh the costs. Consumers form a large group in which each member has only a little to gain from collective action and, therefore, have difficulties in forming powerful interest groups. Our comparison of tax schemes design for CO2 (carbon dioxide) pollution control demonstrated that producers were less heavily taxed than consumers. Thus, public choice theory could explain why uniform taxation did not occur. However, it cannot explain why environmental taxation of producers differs across countries. This chapter addresses this question.

Keywords: Party System; Policy Position; Coalition Government; Labour Party; Liberal Party (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-59553-8_3

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DOI: 10.1057/9780230595538_3

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