 Intentionality and MindGordon R. Foxall Chapter Chapter 3 in Explaining Consumer Choice, 2007, pp 49-62 from Palgrave Macmillan Abstract: Abstract Although the view of intentionality being taken here would be agreed by many philosophers of mind, elaborate and remold it how they might, it requires to be stated explicitly and its implications understood. Searle (2004, p. 28) writes that “‘Intentionality’ is a technical term used by philosophers to refer to that capacity of the mind by which mental states refer to, or are about, or are of objects and states of affairs in the world other than themselves.” However one defines “mind,” this captures the essence of aboutness and mentality that we have espoused so far. It is true to Brentano in being capable of embracing intensional inexistence and the opacity of intentionalistic expressions. Now, save to emphasize that intentionality is a verbal phenomenon (following Chisholm, 1957; Dennett, 1969), one that concerns sentences and types of explanation rather than something that refers ontologically to mental and physical realities, the view taken here does not depart from this understanding. This view is neither Dennettian nor Searlean in its entirety, however, something which requires further elaboration. Keywords: Conscious Experience; Conscious State; Ontological Argument; Intentional Stance; Shopping List (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-59979-6_3 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Palgrave Macmillan Books from Palgrave Macmillan |
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