The UK Model of Central Bank Independence: An Assessment

Ed Balls and Gus O’Donnell

Chapter 6 in Reforming Britain’s Economic and Financial Policy, 2002, pp 85-109 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract This chapter examines the UK model of central bank independence and its roots in the analysis of past economic policy failures, as well as recent theoretical developments. It draws heavily on a lecture given by Ed Balls, chief Economic Adviser to the Treasury, to the Oxford University Business School Alumni Association in June 2001 (Balls 2001) and a forthcoming paper co-authored by Gus O’Donnell, the Treasury’s representative on the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee, and Ashok Bhundia.

Keywords: Monetary Policy; Central Bank; Fiscal Policy; Inflation Target; Central Bank Independence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-59983-3_7

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.palgrave.com/9780230599833

DOI: 10.1057/9780230599833_7

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Palgrave Macmillan Books from Palgrave Macmillan
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().