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Basic Sanction Analysis

Robert Eyler

Chapter Chapter 2 in Economic Sanctions, 2007, pp 9-33 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract To study economic statecraft is to study international economics. These policies of economic coercion, to affect political change, are case-specific in their characteristics, involving many nations and cultures. By changing the way a nation consumes, works, and saves, theory suggests economic sanctions can levy a tax on the target’s regime and populace to engage its rulers directly for change. Policy choices transmitting welfare redistributions among the parties involved, and also creating externalities that affect other groups indirectly, are the essence of political economy. In this chapter, basic concepts from international economics are applied to sanctions and some seminal works in the literature are discussed vis-à-vis these basic ideas. This chapter’s literature review is selective and not meant to be comprehensive. Relevant literature is mentioned and discussed throughout this text when topical.

Keywords: Gross Domestic Product; Welfare Loss; World Price; Economic Sanction; Trade Dependence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-61000-2_2

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DOI: 10.1057/9780230610002_2

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