Sanction Initiation and Continuance: Enter Game Theory

Robert Eyler

Chapter Chapter 3 in Economic Sanctions, 2007, pp 35-58 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Sanctions act like wars of attrition. The sender attempts to manipulate the target’s wealth and income such that the target acquiesces and give up its prey. Instead of lions fighting over a gazelle in the sub-Saharan plains, the prey is the ability to engage in human rights abuses, aboveground nuclear testing, invasion of a neighbor, technology piracy, and so on. As embargoes continue to be acts of diplomacy, costs mount on both sides and reduce the benefits of respective actions: the deviant behavior of the target and the sender’s economic statecraft. The imposition of sanctions represents a deadweight loss of utility for both nations, providing an incentive to reach an agreement before imposition (Drezner 2003, 644).

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Dominant Strategy; Sequential Game; Economic Sanction; Credible Threat (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-61000-2_3

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.palgrave.com/9780230610002

DOI: 10.1057/9780230610002_3

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Palgrave Macmillan Books from Palgrave Macmillan
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().