Combining Autocracy and Majority Voting: The Canonical Succession Rules of the Latin Church

Luisa Giuriato

Chapter 6 in The Political Economy of Theocracy, 2009, pp 143-164 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Numerantur enim sententiae, non ponderantur, nec aliud in publico consilio potest fieri 1 (Plinius, Epistulae, Book II, 12, 5): the Latin Church opposed for centuries the application of this principle to the procedures for its leadership replacement, which were essentially based on elections. Unanimity and the weighting of votes had dominated the ecclesiastic elections during the first millennium, until the pure numerical rule of majority was given juridical (canonical) form2 and was finally adopted, in coincidence with the major institutional reform of the Church in the eleventh to thirteenth century.

Keywords: Vote Rule; Thirteenth Century; Succession Rule; Temporal Power; Autocratic Regime (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Working Paper: Combining autocracy and majority voting: the canonical succession rules of the Latin Church (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-62006-3_7

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.palgrave.com/9780230620063

DOI: 10.1057/9780230620063_7

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Palgrave Macmillan Books from Palgrave Macmillan
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().