Dynamic Common Agency

Ursula F. Ott

Chapter 6 in International Joint Ventures, 2006, pp 143-159 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Based on the uncertainties about the quality of the management, this chapter will look at the dynamic approach towards this problem. In general, skills are not observable ex ante. Thus, contracts have to be offered to get a true revelation of the quality of their skills. Several ways of moving are possible which might result in screening or signaling. Signaling takes place when the agent knows his ability and offers his skills first. In case the parents move first and offer their contracts, there we have a screening scenario.

Keywords: Incentive Scheme; Grand Coalition; Foreign Agent; International Joint Venture; Reservation Utility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-62546-4_6

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DOI: 10.1057/9780230625464_6

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