Language Games and Economic Theory

Roger Koppl
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Roger Koppl: Fairleigh Dickinson University

Chapter 5 in Big Players and the Economic Theory of Expectations, 2002, pp 73-95 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract The theory of expectations developed in Chapter 6 integrates many elements. It relies heavily on Schutz and Hayek. To integrate those elements coherently, it is convenient to abandon the “neoclassical” model of rational maximizing in favor of a rule-following model. In the rule-following framework I will propose, however, neoclassical models reappear as important special cases. The version of rule-following I will propose was originally proposed by Koppl and Langlois (1994). Any social action is a skilled performance subject to the publicly known rules of some language game. (Compare Koppl and Langlois, 1994, pp. 81–82.) A “language game” is “a set of rules about how to talk, think, and act in different situations” (Koppl and Langlois, 1994, p. 82).

Keywords: Mental Model; Hourly Wage; Language Game; Explanatory Framework; Piece Rate (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-62924-0_5

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DOI: 10.1057/9780230629240_5

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