 Tactical HiringMichael Taillard Chapter 12 in Economics and Modern Warfare, 2012, pp 97-102 from Palgrave Macmillan Abstract: Abstract In Chapter 3, the importance of hiring foreign nationals and, in particular, those individuals either neutral or who have changed sides from working with the enemy, was stressed. Up until now, however, the issues of quality of life have only been hinted at as a method of giving these individuals incentive to associate themselves with an organization whose purpose it is to be involved in combat and, in extreme examples, even encouraging individuals to change their allegiance in the conflict. In supply manipulation, this was done simply to reduce the quantity and quality of skilled workers for the enemy and provide one’s own people with an ample supply for high-quality individuals ready to be utilized. Since the high pay will attract not only better people but also more people, the amount that people could expect from other employers would increase as well, putting the quality workers out of the price range of enemy combatants who are otherwise still using local wage levels and forcing them to allocate a disproportionate amount of resources to supporting operations rather than combat operations thereby leaving them understaffed and with inferior labor quality. Date: 2012 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-28225-5_14 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Palgrave Macmillan Books from Palgrave Macmillan |
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