Agents of Paradise and the Rise of Self-interest

Sigmund A. Wagner-Tsukamoto

Chapter 3 in The Economics of Paradise, 2015, pp 70-98 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract The previous chapter highlighted the contested nature of capital exchange in the paradise setting; that conflict over capital contributions and distributions essentially defined paradise operating in a rather ‘capitalistic’ way. This chapter looks in greater detail at underlying reasons why paradise interactions could escalate so easily into conflict. A key thesis is that the agents of paradise compare well with the model of the economic agent: homo economicus. This model invokes self-interest and utility ‘optimization’ in different shades and levels as the key driving force of behaviour (for a review, see Kirchgässner 2014). In this regard, the chapter examines how closely the agents of the Paradise story (God, Adam and Eve, and the serpent) compare with a model of self-interested, utility-focused choice, and possibly worse, to what Buchanan (1975) called outright predation, or Williamson (1975, 1985), slightly more mildly, termed opportunism and subtle self-seeking with guile.

Keywords: Human Nature; Social Contract; Economic Agent; Heuristic Function; Divine Tree (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-28770-0_5

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DOI: 10.1057/9781137287700_5

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