Government Incentives, Traditional Values, and the Shaping of Agrarian Interests

Michele L. Crumley

Chapter 6 in Sowing Market Reforms, 2013, pp 93-117 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract In the first decade of post-Soviet reforms, the obfuscation of a real land market by regional and local administrators and the unwillingness of farm managers to implement the kind of reforms that could lead to the laying off of workers or bankruptcy meant that economic indicators did not accurately represent conditions in the Russian agrarian sector. Moreover, regional authorities’ intervention in interregional trade further veiled opportunity costs and price signals that could have led to the development of regional comparative advantage. Local and regional authorities advocated populist policies, typically showing reluctance to resort to austere economic measures. Furthermore, altering the agricultural producers’ relationship to the land and other assets, as well as the freeing of prices, did not create the conditions for which producers had new incentives to change their organization and behavior.

Keywords: Large Farm; Federal Budget; Soviet Period; Soft Budget Constraint; Private Farmer (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-31320-1_6

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DOI: 10.1057/9781137313201_6

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