The Conflicts of Managerial Capitalism

Bernard E. Munk

Chapter Chapter 6 in Disorganized Crimes, 2013, pp 61-78 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract As the Long Boom ended, the scope of financial scandals exposed to public inspection expanded considerably. Some took the view that scandals merely represented “a few bad apples at the bottom of the barrel.” If few in number, they were quite large in their impact. The “few bad apples” view became increasingly difficult to sustain. Congress didn’t believe it; the media didn’t believe it; and many commentators on corporate governance didn’t believe it either. The losses were just too large to be explained away as unusual occurrences of managerial excess.

Keywords: Corporate Governance; Earning Management; Stock Option; Corporate Control; Managerial Capitalism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-33027-7_6

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.palgrave.com/9781137330277

DOI: 10.1057/9781137330277_6

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Palgrave Macmillan Books from Palgrave Macmillan
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().