“Agents without Principals” Revisited: Theorizing the Effects of Increased Shareholder Participation in Corporate Governance

Thomas M. Jones and Adrian A. C. Keevil

Chapter Chapter 5 in Shareholder Empowerment, 2015, pp 103-135 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract The subject of corporate governance—defined by Ryan, Buchholtz, and Kolb as “the roles, responsibilities, and balance of power among executives, directors, and shareholders” (2010: 673)—presents management scholars with a number of vexing problems. These problems have included such issues as executive compensation, the adoption of poison pills, the payment of greenmail, the establishment of golden parachutes, and resistance to many shareholder proposals on annual proxy ballots. While many of these issues are of concern mainly to scholars and shareholder activists, executive compensation, because of the ever-increasing multiple of executive pay to average worker pay (Economic Policy Institute, 2013), also resonates with many members of the general public.

Keywords: Corporate Governance; Hedge Fund; Agency Theory; Executive Compensation; Corporate Control (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-37393-9_5

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.palgrave.com/9781137373939

DOI: 10.1057/9781137373939_5

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Palgrave Macmillan Books from Palgrave Macmillan
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().