His and Her Pensions: Intra-Household Imbalances in Old Age

Gianni Betti, Francesca Bettio, Thomas Georgiadis and Platon Tinios

Chapter 7 in Unequal Ageing in Europe, 2015, pp 123-134 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract According to a well-known argument in economics—the intrahousehold bargaining hypothesis first introduced by Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981)—the partner with the largest bargaining power has the largest say in decisions taken at the household level. Bargaining power crucially depends on the amount and adequacy of resources each partner could muster in case of separation. In old age, pension income is one such key resource. Empirical evidence, however, has not uniformly supported the idea that the partner commanding more monetary resources has the biggest say in household’s decision making.1 Yet the appeal that this line of reasoning continues to exercise is strong as it resonates with the deeply held notion that it matters for economic independence who “brings home the bacon.”

Keywords: Elderly Couple; Assortative Mating; Pension System; Effective Shield; Economic Independence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-38410-2_7

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DOI: 10.1057/9781137384102_7

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