Fairness as a Precondition for Profit Seeking

Alexander Pepper
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Alexander Pepper: London School of Economics and Political Science

Chapter 6 in The Economic Psychology of Incentives, 2015, pp 105-128 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Scholarly work in a number of academic traditions has demonstrated that fairness is a key factor in determining whether employees are satisfied with their pay, especially when comparisons are made with the compensation of other team members. Yet fairness among senior executives, especially intra top-management teams, has not generally featured in theoretical accounts of executive rewards and incentives. Equity considerations play no part in agency theory or tournament theory.1 Some management scholars argue that fairness is germane to senior executives.2 However, empirical evidence about top managers’ attitudes to fairness has historically been limited.

Keywords: Agency Theory; Ultimatum Game; Senior Executive; Economic Psychology; Senior Management Team (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-40925-6_6

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DOI: 10.1057/9781137409256_6

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