Winner’s Curse in an Auction

Gregor Berz

Chapter 6 in Game Theory Bargaining and Auction Strategies, 2015, pp 90-99 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract The classic example of common value is represented by oil fields which are auctioned to private oil companies. One of the famous cases is that of the Chinese oil company Natural Petroleum Corporation which had to pay an exorbitant price at the auction of oil drilling rights held by Venezuela in 1997. This is the background.

Keywords: Railway Company; English Auction; Indifference Price; Auction Strategy; Auction Dynamic (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-47542-8_7

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DOI: 10.1057/9781137475428_7

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