Monetizing value improves democracy and yields

Dag Detter and Stefan Fölster

Chapter Chapter 9 in The Public Wealth of Nations, 2015, pp 125-135 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract One would never expect a politician in charge of healthcare, or their ministry appointees, to run a hospital or decide which X-ray equipment to buy. Yet, as long as the governance of public commercial assets is kept inside government, as in a centrally planned economy, politicians and government bureaucrats will always be suspected of interference. If fear of being accused of interference leads to totally passive ownership, orphaned SOEs may also fail.

Keywords: Corporate Governance; Credit Rating; Private Equity; Vested Interest; Clear Objective (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-51986-3_9

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DOI: 10.1057/9781137519863_9

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