Initial Responses in Strategic Situations

Nagore Iriberri and Pedro Rey-Biel

Chapter 5 in Experimental Economics, 2015, pp 72-86 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract In this chapter we analyze the behavior of individuals when facing strategic situations for the first time. First, we motivate our study through simple examples where, for different reasons, behavior may differ from the Nash equilibrium prediction. Subsequently, we describe different models that have been used to account for alternative types of behavior in novel situations. Finally, we explain the most common experimental techniques used to analyze the validity of such models in different strategic situations.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Simple Game; Normal Form Game; Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium; Initial Behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-53819-2_5

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DOI: 10.1057/9781137538192_5

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