The Political Market for Protection in Industrial Countries

Kym Anderson and Robert Baldwin

Chapter 2 in Protection, Cooperation, Integration and Development, 1987, pp 20-36 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract One of the strongest conclusions following from neoclassical trade theory is that protection of domestic industries from import competition generally lowers average real income in a country unless that country’s trade volume is so large that changes in it affect international prices. Why, then, is protection so pervasive? Is it because some individuals and groups in society are more politically powerful than others and so are able to influence policies in their favour despite undesired costs to the rest of the community? Or is it that in granting protection governments are reflecting the preferences of the community and government officials in assisting certain industries for such ‘non-economic’ reasons as maintaining employment in those otherwise declining industries?1

Keywords: Tariff Rate; Import Penetration; Political Market; Tokyo Round; Kennedy Round (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1987
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-349-09370-0_2

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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-09370-0_2

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