Job Security and Unemployment

Edward P. Lazear

Chapter 9 in Advances in the Theory and Measurement of Unemployment, 1990, pp 245-267 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Many European countries restrict an employer’s ability to terminate workers at will. Although such restrictions are absent formally from the American labour scene, courts and other institutions, such as experience-rated unemployment insurance, have eroded the employer’s ability to dismiss workers without cost. The standard argument in favour of job security laws is that the laws protect workers from unjust termination by employers, which imposes significant mobility costs on workers. Opponents of job security rules argue that unemployment will result because employers become more reluctant to hire new workers.

Keywords: Labour Market; Labour Force; Unemployment Rate; Country Dummy; Plant Closing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1990
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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-10688-2_9

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