 Wage Bargaining in the Share EconomyFranco Cugno and
Mario Ferrero
Chapter 6 in Share Systems and Unemployment, 1991, pp 53-73 from Palgrave Macmillan Abstract: Abstract In this chapter we consider a world in which the senior employees of a firm (insiders) differ from the new entrants or the unemployed (outsiders) in that, even though their ability and productivity is potentially the same as everybody else’s, they enjoy a market power vis-à-vis the firm because of the existence of turnover costs (for example, hiring, firing, and training costs). Thanks to these costs the insiders are able to raise their wage above the minimal level required to induce workers to become entrants. For this reason the system may exhibit involuntary unemployment in long-run equilibrium, one that — unlike the type of unemployment considered in the previous chapters — is unaffected by cyclical fluctuations in demand. The existence of labour unions at firm level fits easily into this framework, further reinforcing the insiders’ bargaining power, but is not a necessary condition for an equilibrium unemployment to arise. Keywords: Share Scheme; Employment Level; Share System; Revenue Sharing; Profit Sharing (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-349-11530-3_6 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-11530-3_6 Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Palgrave Macmillan Books from Palgrave Macmillan |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.