Equilibrium in a Matching Market with General Preferences

Ahmet Alkan

Chapter 1 in Equilibrium and Dynamics, 1992, pp 1-16 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract One of the earliest matching market models to appear was in David Gale’s The Theory of Linear Economic Models (1960) as an interpretation of the optimal assignment problem and its dual. This covered, as it is sometimes called, the ‘linear homogeneous case’ where a buyer’s utility for money is constant and independent of the object he may be assigned. The model has since been substantially generalised and shown to have various remarkable properties, some of which we will refer to below. Our purpose in this study is to give a proof of existence of competitive equilibrium in a matching market allowing rather general preferences, and then to construct a procedure whereby an equilibrium can be reached in an auction. The latter in fact generalises a ‘multi-item auction’ for the linear homogeneous case by Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (1986).

Keywords: Reservation Price; Competitive Equilibrium; Price Vector; Linear Domain; Active Buyer (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1992
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-349-11696-6_1

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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-11696-6_1

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