Trade as a Bargaining Tool in the Second Berlin Crisis, 1958–61

Hélène Seppain

Chapter 7 in Contrasting US and German Attitudes to Soviet Trade, 1917–91, 1992, pp 152-178 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract The second Berlin crisis of 1958–61 marked a turning point in West Germany’s Deutschlandpolitik and Ostpolitik. The use of East-West trade as a bargaining tool to gain concessions from the Soviet Union on the question of German unity and the status of Berlin was part of Adenauer’s ‘policy of strength’. The second Berlin crisis illustrated the failure of this policy.

Keywords: Federal Government; Trade Agreement; Diplomatic Relation; Soviet Bloc; Western Power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1992
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-349-12602-6_8

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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-12602-6_8

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