Oligopoly under Rivalrous Consonance: An Exploration of Phantom Objective Functions and some Algorithmic Considerations

Robert E. Kuenne
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Robert E. Kuenne: Princeton University

Chapter 7 in General Equilibrium Economics, 1992, pp 172-190 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract In economic theorizing economic agents are generally depicted as optimizing objective functions based on narrow self-interest, with global or social variable values emerging from the interaction of the individual optimization procedure. An interesting question is whether there exists a ‘phantom’ objective function whose optimization would yield the same solutions as the set of interacting optimizing decisions does. For example, to cite a famous case, in a purely competitive capitalistic general equilibrium model, is there a social welfare function whose optimization would yield the same solutions for the model as those obtained from solving the whole set of first-order conditions of the conventional model?

Keywords: Objective Function; Opportunity Cost; Feasible Region; Constraint Capacity; Capacity Usage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1992
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-349-12752-8_8

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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-12752-8_8

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