Introduction

Randall Holcombe

Chapter 1 in The Economic Foundations of Government, 1994, pp 1-10 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract The institutions of government are the result of human design, but the operation of governmental institutions may differ from the intentions of their designers. One reason is that actions may have unintended consequences, so institutions designed to have one effect may end up having other effects in addition to — or at times instead of — their intended effects. Another reason why governmental institutions in the real world will never exactly reflect the preferences of any particular designer is because those institutions are the result of compromise. Public sector institutions are produced by a bargaining process in which the preferences of many individuals are aggregated to produce the institutional structure ultimately referred to as government.

Keywords: Government Institution; Governmental Institution; Collective Agreement; Constitutional Rule; Bargaining Process (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994
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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-13230-0_1

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