Coalitions

Michael Allingham
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Michael Allingham: University of Kent

Chapter 5 in Value, 1983, pp 32-40 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Given that society as a whole accepts the market mechanism I now enquire whether all coalitions in society do likewise. This will be the case if the allocation which each possible coalition of agents receives under the market mechanism is better for the coalition than any other allocation it could obtain. This is a second requirement for equilibrium prices to be relevant; if may be seen as an extension of the first requirement, that society as a whole accept the market.

Keywords: Average Bundle; Indifference Curve; Monopoly Power; Equilibrium Allocation; Feasible Allocation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1983
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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-17001-2_5

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