The Logical Foundations of Analogy and the Justification of Induction by Common Sense

Anna M. Carabelli
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Anna M. Carabelli: University of Pavia

Chapter 5 in On Keynes’s Method, 1988, pp 73-87 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Keynes tackled the first point, concerning the assumptions lying behind inductive reasoning, starting again from ‘pure induction’, that is from mere empirical induction. He considered the thesis advanced by the supporters of such a position, according to which each successive verification or further instance was bound to strengthen the inductive generalisation. He pointed out that the assertion was equivalent to saying that the probability prior to instantial evidence, that is, what he called a priori, or ‘initial’, probability, of ‘pure induction’, ‘approached certainty as a limit or even that our conclusion becomes more likely than not, as the number of verifications or instances is indefinitely increased’. And he asked what the logical condition which must be satisfied in such a case was (TP, CW VIII, p. 263).

Date: 1988
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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-19414-8_5

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