Monetary Union and ‘Federal’ Europe?

Malcolm Crawford

Chapter 19 in One Money for Europe?, 1996, pp 338-348 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract The prospect that Europe might, as a result of Maastricht, become a federal union with excessively strong central powers, was not widely feared in the Community at the time the treaty was under negotiation. The United Kingdom was almost alone in expressing such concerns at the time. As was shown in Chapter 11, the treaty signed at Maastricht did very little to shift the EC constitution in that direction — thanks in large part to resolution and skill of the British negotiators. Subsequently, in the wake of the Danish referendum in June 1992 and the very narrow outcome of the one held in France in September, a backlash against the EC’s decision mechanisms, and any extension of its powers, developed with remarkable speed.

Keywords: Member State; Monetary Policy; European Monetary; Maastricht Treaty; Political Union (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-349-25035-6_19

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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-25035-6_19

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