Independence and Accountability
Clive Briault,
Andrew Haldane and
Mervyn A. King
Chapter 10 in Towards More Effective Monetary Policy, 1997, pp 299-340 from Palgrave Macmillan
Abstract:
Abstract Over the past few years many central banks have made significant strides toward greater accountability and transparency. There has been a dilution of what Karl Brunner (1981) once called the “peculiar and protective political mystique” that has traditionally surrounded central banking. Central banks in all of the countries which have recently adopted inflation targets have become more open about the formulation and presentation of their monetary policies (Haldane, 1995). Similar such moves have been evident among central banks recently granted greater independence through legislative changes — for example, in France. And in the United States there is active debate on the replacement of the Humphrey-Hawkins Act — and its multiple objectives — with a single inflation objective, and on the publication of the full transcripts of Federal Open Market Cammittee (FOMC) meetings.
Keywords: Monetary Policy; Central Bank; Inflation Target; Optimal Contract; Inflation Expectation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-349-25382-1_10
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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-25382-1_10
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