Research Joint Venture Cartels and Welfare

Raymond Bondt and Changqi Wu

Chapter 3 in Competition, Cooperation, Research and Development, 1997, pp 39-56 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Cooperative arrangements in R&D among otherwise competing firms have evolved as a response to the externalities that accompany such strategic investment activities. The modes of cooperation differ in several ways but particularly in the extent that they allow a more useful information-sharing and a better coordination of efforts. Sometimes firms continue to compete and simply share more information. In other cases they only coordinate efforts, and in still other instances they realize both a better coordination of investments and a better sharing of information.

Keywords: Static Welfare; Consumer Surplus; Investment Level; Stable Coalition; Unit Production Cost (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-25814-7_3

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