Evolutionary game analysis on decision-making behaviors of participants in mega projects

Daoping Chen () and Binbin Chen
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Daoping Chen: Chongqing Normal University
Binbin Chen: Chongqing Normal University

Palgrave Communications, 2023, vol. 10, issue 1, 1-16

Abstract: Abstract Mega projects have a huge impact on the economy and society. Preventing collusive behavior and introducing public participation in supervision are conducive to the governance of mega projects and are crucial to the success of mega projects. The owner, the construction party, and the supervisor of the mega project are regarded as a collusion-body that may collude. Based on the evolutionary game theory, an evolutionary game model with collusion-body, the government, and the public as the participants is constructed. The stability of each participant’s strategy selection is analyzed, the conditions for achieving the evolutionarily stable strategy are obtained, and the evolutionary path of the strategy is simulated. The results show that the costs and benefits have important effects on the behavior of the three participants. Each participant’s strategy choice is affected by other participants, and there is a certain critical probability for each participant. If the critical value is greater than or less than, the participant’s strategy will change. There are five evolutionary stable strategies in the game system, and the costs and benefits conditions to achieve each evolutionary stable strategy are different. In the case of active government intervention and public participation in supervision, the ideal stabilization strategy can be achieved by changing the costs and benefits parameters of the participants, and then the governance effectiveness of the collusive behavior of mega projects can be improved.

Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1057/s41599-023-02436-w

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