When Things Go Wrong: Credit, Defaults and Institutions in Early Modern Venice

Isabella Cecchini
Additional contact information
Isabella Cecchini: Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia

A chapter in Financing in Europe, 2018, pp 47-74 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Cecchini analyses how merchants and political institutions cope with failures and defaults that compromise credit relationships in an early modern trading centre. Focusing on the structure of financing business and trade in Venice and on the legal framework that protects creditors, she links the widespread form of trading company (the temporary partnership) to the large recourse to arbitration procedures for solving disputes, and to the lesser efficiency of institutional and legal frameworks traditionally securing credit rights in Venice. ‘Credit, Defaults and Institutions in Early Modern Venice’ concludes with the hypothesis that the changing commercial environment and the spread of temporary societies reduce the protective strength of Venetian institutions and increase instability in financing international trade.

Keywords: Early Modern Venice; Temporary Partnership; Creditor Rights; Rialto; Limited Partnership (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:psitcp:978-3-319-58493-5_3

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.palgrave.com/9783319584935

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-58493-5_3

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Palgrave Studies in the History of Finance from Palgrave Macmillan
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().