Product Design in a Cournot Duopoly

Daniel Voelkening ()

No 216, DEM Working Papers Series from University of Pavia, Department of Economics and Management

Abstract: Product design is studied in a simple duopoly where firms compete à la Cournot, goods are hedonically differentiated and consumers have preferences defined over characteristics. What we find is that, in equilibrium, firms choose the same product’s design. This results in horizontal product differentiation being minimal.

Keywords: Hedonic Product Differentiation; Horizontal Differentiation; Product Design; Cournot Competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 L20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13
Date: 2024-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-cta, nep-gth, nep-ind and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pav:demwpp:demwp0216

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