Contribution and bribe: lobbying in presence of incumbent and bureaucrat

Marco Catola

Discussion Papers from Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy

Abstract: This paper discusses the effects on the quality of the decision of the introduction of a watchdog bureaucrat who provides policy recommendations that are costly to be ignored. Through a simple model, it is shown that, if both the politician and the bureaucrat are sensitive to the pressure of an interest group, the positive impact of bureaucrats is very small, even though not null. Moreover, by characterising the conditions that allow this effect, it is shown that if the bureaucrat's recommendation is too binding, the decision power moves from the politician to the bureaucrat, producing a reduction in accountability without any improvement in the quality of the decision.

Keywords: lobbying; interest group; decision making process; bureaucracy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-07-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
Note: ISSN 2039-1854
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pie:dsedps:2019/247

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