Games with Private Timing

Sofia Moroni

No 6400, Working Paper from Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh

Abstract: We study a class of games in which the timing of players' moves is privateinformation, but players have the option to disclose their moves byexerting a small cost. When the underlying game is a coordination game,we characterize the set of distributions of moving times such that the gamehas the following unique prediction: Players choose the best coordinationequilibrium and do not disclose their action. This implies that the possibilityof disclosure selects an equilibrium in which the best action pro le istaken but nothing is disclosed. In games of opposing interests, we providesufficient conditions for the fi rst-arriving player to disclose her action. Inextensions we allow for, among others, partial control over timing.

Date: 2018-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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