Existence of trembling hand perfect and sequential equilibrium in games with stochastic timing of moves

Sofia Moroni

No 6757, Working Paper from Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh

Abstract: We consider continuous time games in which players have stochastic opportunitiesto move before a deadline. In this paper we define notions of trembling handand sequential equilibrium and show that both types of equilibria exist in a large classof such games that may feature incomplete and imperfect information. These gamesmodel realistic non-stationary dynamic situations in which players do not know exactlywhen they or their opponents will be able to move. In the complete informationcase we establish existence of a Markov Perfect equilibrium.

Date: 2019-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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