Dworkin’s Paradox

Seung Ki Baek, Jung-Kyoo Choi and Beom Jun Kim

PLOS ONE, 2012, vol. 7, issue 6, 1-6

Abstract: How to distribute welfare in a society is a key issue in the subject of distributional justice, which is deeply involved with notions of fairness. Following a thought experiment by Dworkin, this work considers a society of individuals with different preferences on the welfare distribution and an official to mediate the coordination among them. Based on a simple assumption that an individual’s welfare is proportional to how her preference is fulfilled by the actual distribution, we show that an egalitarian preference is a strict Nash equilibrium and can be favorable even in certain inhomogeneous situations. These suggest how communication can encourage and secure a notion of fairness.

Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:plo:pone00:0038529

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0038529

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