Justine Effect: Punishment of the Unduly Self-Sacrificing Cooperative Individuals

Aleš Antonín Kuběna, Petr Houdek, Jitka Lindová, Lenka Příplatová and Jaroslav Flegr

PLOS ONE, 2014, vol. 9, issue 3, 1-8

Abstract: Background: Allowing players to punish their opponents in Public Goods Game sustains cooperation within a group and thus brings advantage to the cooperative individuals. However, the possibility of punishment of the co-players can result in antisocial punishment, the punishment of those players who contribute the most in the group. To better understand why antisocial punishment exists, it must be determined who are the anti-social punishers and who are their primary targets. Methods: For resolving these questions we increased the number of players in a group from usual four to twelve. Each group played six rounds of the standard Public Goods Game and six rounds of the Public Goods Game with punishment. Each player in each round received 20 CZK ($ 1.25). Players (N = 118) were rematched after each round so that they would not take into consideration opponents' past behavior. Results: The amount of the punishment received correlated negatively with the contribution (ρ = −0.665, p

Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:plo:pone00:0092336

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0092336

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